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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of recent consolidation within the North American ski
industry on day ticket and season pass prices. It utilizes a unique cross-sectional data set
consisting of 120 ski areas in the US and Canada for the 2018/19 ski season. Using an OLS
hedonic price model, I find that conglomerate owned ski areas price day tickets and season
passes well above those of independent ski areas. However, for ski areas that are included on
multi-area season passes such as the Epic or Ikon Pass, consumers actually pay a far lower price
for their season passes. This is possible because the vertical integration of conglomerate owners
enables them to extract additional profits from ancillary revenue streams such as dining and
lodging. The results provide evidence that conglomerates possess elevated pricing power but
cannot conclusively present a case for antitrust intervention.
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Introduction
The competitive landscape in the North American ski industry has seen a significant

transformation over the course of the last two decades. A wave of consolidation that began in
earnest during the early 2000s has seen conglomerates spend well over $3 billion acquiring ski
areas, sweeping up a vast majority of the most iconic and popular resorts (Gittelsohn, 2017 and
Megroz, 2018). While many smaller ski areas remain independent, the largest ski areas across
the United States and Canada now belong to a select few conglomerate owners. The three most
prominent players in the industry, Vail Resorts, Alterra Mountain Company, and Boyne Resorts,
now account for over 80% of revenue in the US (Hyland, 2018). Some skiers bemoan this
development as they view the corporate owners as taking the character out of their local
mountain.1 However, there are also positive economic benefits as these conglomerates have
introduced new multi-area season passes that undercut the price of some traditional pass
products. This paper seeks to empirically identify the true impact of consolidated ownership on
both day ticket prices and season pass prices.
A complete collection of publicly available data did not exist for an analysis of this type,
so I created a unique data set with information from both official and independent sources. The
data is cross-sectional and covers 120 ski areas in North America over the 2018/19 ski season.
There are four main categories of variables; ski area statistics, snowfall measurements, ticket
pricing and passes, and ownership. Ski area statistics control for the permanent characteristics of
each mountain that skiers’ value, such as the amount of terrain available and type of ski
infrastructure. Snowfall is split into official and independent measurements. Official data is
included for all ski areas in the sample, but this number is prone to overestimating the actual

1

For simplicity, the term “skiers” is inclusive of both skiers and snowboarders in this paper.
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snowfall total since marketing purposes provide incentives to exaggerate. An independent
measure that uses avalanche forecasting data eliminates this potential source of error but is only
available for 79 ski areas in the sample. The prices for day tickets and season passes are
combined with dummy variables that measure a ski areas’ inclusion on a multi-area season pass.
The ownership variables are dummies that measure whether or not a ski area is owned by a
conglomerate along with which specific conglomerate it is.
Following Fonner and Berrens (2014), this paper employs a linear hedonic pricing model
which takes the form of an OLS regression. The most basic form of the regression finds that
holding all else equal, conglomerates price day tickets $15 to $17 above independent ski areas,
which is roughly 16% of the average ticket price from the sample. When the dummy variables
for multi-area season passes are added to the regression, the premium conglomerates command
over independent ski areas drops slightly to just over $11. The same regression model, when
using season pass price as the dependent variable, finds that conglomerates in general price
season passes over $350 higher than an equivalent independent area, which is roughly 40% of
the average season pass price in the sample. However, for ski areas with multi-area season pass
inclusion, the model finds that there is actually a discount of roughly $400. A region specific
analysis finds that conglomerates’ western ski areas possess more pricing power than eastern ski
areas for both day ticket prices and season passes.
This may seem like a counterintuitive result, but the business models of Vail Resorts and
Alterra align with the findings. These conglomerate owners have consistently raised day ticket
prices in order to push consumers toward season pass products. Season passes ensure skier
loyalty to a particular ski area and reduce revenue exposure to snow conditions as they are prepaid products, making them highly favorable from a conglomerate standpoint. A further
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incentive for consumers to switch to a season pass is the relatively recent innovation of multiarea season passes. Vertical integration that captures ancillary revenue from products such as
lodging and dining is a key reason why these passes can undercut the prices of independent
areas. By attracting a greater number of consistent skiers, the conglomerates can make up any
losses from pass sales via the margins on the ancillary products.
Overall, this paper contributes five main points to the existing literature. First, it expands
Fonner and Berrens (2014) geographic analysis to include Canada along with the US, since both
markets are substitutes for one another. Second, it incorporates controls for the ownership of
each ski area, similar to the European focused Falk (2009) paper, which is critical due to the
aforementioned consolidation within the North American industry. Third, it adds season pass
price as a dependent variable, something not seen in any previous paper, as pass sales make up a
large portion of overall industry sales. Fourth, it incorporates controls for multi-area pass
inclusion as they make up a sizeable slice of total season pass sales. Fifth, it controls for state
fixed effects because there are unobservable differences in liability regulations and local ski
culture between states, another aspect not seen in any previous ski industry related paper.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides background on
the current North American ski industry. Section 3 reviews relevant literature regarding the ski
industry, ticket pricing, and the empirical framework. Section 4 covers the data and collection
process. Section 5 explains the empirical methodology. Section 6 presents the results of the
regressions. Section 7 discusses implications, potential shortcomings, future research areas, and
concludes the paper.
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Industry Background
Over the past four decades, the North American ski industry has seen minimal growth.

The National Ski Areas Association (NSAA) publishes an annual survey which estimates US
snowsports visits going back to the 1981/82 season.2 Total annual visits in that initial season
reached 50.72 million, and by the 2017/18 season annual visits had only grown 5% to 53.23
million. Notably, annual visits were over 4 million people higher during the depths of the Great
Recession in 2008/09 than they are presently, underscoring the stagnant nature of the industry
(NSAA, 2018).
The NSAA also tracks the number of ski areas operating in the US, with 546 active areas
during the 1991/91 season falling to 472 active areas currently (NSAA, 2018). A mixture of
difficulty in land acquisition and permitting along with high infrastructure construction costs
means practically no new destination resorts have been built in the last 35 years (Vail Resorts
Inc., 2018). Due to this unique combination of flat long-term visitor growth and an inability to
build new ski areas, the primary way to remain economically competitive or expand market
share in the industry is via a merger or acquisition of an existing ski area. There are currently
eleven multi-resort ownership companies in North America who collectively control 100
individual ski areas (NSAA, 2019).3 The remaining ski areas are privately owned, generally by
local ownership groups and families.
Broomfield, CO based Vail Resorts, Inc. pioneered this acquisition strategy, going on a
multi-year spending spree and accumulating a broad, international portfolio of ski-related assets.
Vail currently owns seventeen resorts in North America, including six of the top ten highest

2
3

Due to the fragmented nature of ownership, it is impossible to obtain exact ski area visitation numbers.
A multi-resort ownership company is defined as a company that owns two or more ski areas.

6

visited resorts in the US, and accounts for 15.8% of annual skier visits in North America as a
whole (Vail Resorts Inc., 2018). Since 2002, Vail has spent over $1.6 billion on acquisitions,
including a record $1.06 billion for the 2016 purchase of Whistler Blackcomb in Canada
(Gittelsohn, 2017). The other significant player in the industry is Alterra Mountain Company, a
recently formed partnership between private equity firm KSL Capital Partners and Aspen Skiing
Company. Alterra currently owns seventeen resorts across the US and Canada (NSAA, 2019). In
2017 alone, the company spent $1.5 billion to acquire Intrawest Group, including six ski resorts
and a heli-skiing operation, and has continued to acquire ski areas in private transactions since
(Megroz, 2018).
At a foundational level, both independent and multi-area owners utilize price
discrimination strategies in order to maximize ticket revenue. By capitalizing on willingness to
pay differences between consumer groups, they are able to sell functionally identical access to
ski lifts for varied prices and tap into areas of consumer surplus. Independent ski areas generally
offer two tiers of lift tickets; season passes and single-day lift tickets. Season passes are offered
for a flat rate at the beginning of the ski season and grant the purchaser unlimited lift access
exclusively at that ski area. Some ski areas also choose to offer discounted season passes that are
only valid on weekdays or non-holiday periods, along with youth, senior, and military discounts.
Single-day lift tickets are offered throughout the season and many ski areas now also utilize
variable pricing strategies where prices fluctuate based on the day of the week and the expected
quantity of skiers that day. Prices are generally set in advance and do not fluctuate based on
instantaneous demand. For example, at Windham Mountain in New York an adult single-day
ticket during a non-holiday weekday will cost $85, while the same ticket during a weekend or
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holiday period will cost $95, almost 12% higher. Some ski areas also offer discounts for
purchasing single-day tickets in advance and in multiple-day combination packs.
Multi-resort owners also offer both day ticket and season pass options. Day tickets are
priced and sold similarly to independent ski areas, however the primary innovation in ticket
pricing models comes from new multi-resort season passes. Both Vail Resorts and Alterra
Mountain Company sell season passes that are valid across all of their ski resorts, called the Epic
Pass and Ikon Pass, respectively. Each company offers multiple tiers of season passes for a flat
rate at the beginning of the season. They include the highest priced unlimited passes with zero
restrictions down to lower priced options that cap the number of ski days at the most popular
resorts and are not valid over certain holiday periods. Additionally, the passes provide limited
access to “partner” ski areas not owned by the multi-resort companies, normally five to seven
days of free skiing followed by discounted single-day lift tickets. The Epic pass includes 47 of
these partner ski areas across North America, Europe, and Japan, while the Ikon pass includes 23
partners across North America, South America, Australia, and Japan (Megroz, 2018). Generally,
these multi-resort season passes undercut the price of single-resort season passes, with the
difference being made up for in volume along with business models that capture ancillary
revenue from lodging, dining, and other ski related services. Vail reports selling 925,000 Epic
Passes for the 2018/19 season while Alterra expects to sell upwards of 250,000 Ikon Passes, both
large increases over previous seasons (Brown, 2019 and Blevins, 2018).4 As reference for the
total consumer base, the NSAA reports there are roughly 9.2 million current active skiers in the
US (NSAA, 2018).

4

Alterra has not publicly disclosed the exact number of passes sold.
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3

Literature Review

3.1

Oligopolistic Competition
The exact nature of competition within the North American ski industry varies widely

across geographical regions and largely depends on how the market itself is defined. As a result
of the recent consolidation, the national market most closely resembles an oligopoly with a
limited number of firms controlling virtually all of the most popular resorts. In local markets,
competition varies considerably from state to state and consumer bases are generally smaller.
Due to the continuing consolidation across both national and local markets, this paper will
primarily explore impacts with regards to oligopolies.
Durham et al. (2003) investigated oligopolistic competition specifically in industries with
high sunk and avoidable fixed costs. While this paper does not specifically mention skiing, sunk
and avoidable fixed costs are key cost drivers for ski areas. Avoidable fixed costs are costs that
can be eliminated entirely by simply halting that specific business activity. Operating a ski lift
requires an equal amount of electricity and number of attendants if there are 100 skiers per hour
versus 1000, whereas temporarily closing the lift eliminates this entire cost. The expensive
infrastructure investment needed to build a functioning ski area (including lifts, powerlines, and
snowmaking) is the primary sunk cost. The authors found that in this type of industry
environment, firms engagd in “a pattern of price signaling and responses which maintain above
normal profits” (Durham et al., 2003). Because such pricing schemes would negatively impact
skiers, the results of this paper will attempt to shed light on multi-resort ownership companies’
ability to actually inflate prices.
A second paper that investigated oligopolistic competition is Adams and Williams
(2019), which looked specifically at multi-store retailers and their pricing strategies. Similarly to
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multi-resort ownership companies, these retailers can vary the pricing of identical products
depending on the location of their stores. The paper found that industry profits are optimized
when these companies use uniform and market pricing strategies. Uniform pricing is when all
markets are priced identically and market pricing adjusts prices based on local demand. Uniform
pricing is particularly prevalent in multi-area season pass sales since prices for an Epic or Ikon
pass will be identical whether you intend to ski in Vermont or Colorado. Additionally, many
resorts use market pricing for single day lift tickets. Although retail stores are not a directly
comparable industry to skiing, this paper established the ability for large, multi-property owners
to exert pricing power over consumers. A potential issue with this paper is the use of college
students as participants in the study as their decision making likely does not exactly mirror that
of experienced executives in the industry. By breaking out ownership of ski areas, this paper will
provide new insights into how the evolving competitive environment is affecting skiers.
An industry in which pricing schemes bear some resemblance to the ski industry is the
US domestic airline market. Similarly to how ski areas charge different prices for what is
ultimately the same lift access, airlines price discriminate by charging higher prices for certain
classes of tickets even though everyone on the plane reaches the same destination. Additionally,
competitive disparities between the broad US market and the route level market is comparable to
the regionalization in the ski industry. Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) examined whether
competition on airline routes impacts the dispersion of ticket prices using a panel data set from
1993 to 2006. They found that price dispersion for an airline on a particular route will decline as
new entrants join the route which is in line with standard economic competition theory. This
finding suggests that a more concentrated ski industry would provide firms with greater price
discrimination abilities that would enable them to take more consumer surplus for themselves.
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Ultimately, this could manifest itself in the form of higher ticket prices for those with lower price
elasticities, such as out-of-town vacationers. A couple key areas of divergence between the
airline and ski industries include that there are far fewer firms in the US airline industry than
there are ski areas and that skiing is purely a leisure activity where you will not find lower
elasticity “business” skiers.

3.2

Hedonic Price Models
The fundamental concept behind the hedonic price model is that the price of a good is an

equilibrium value calculated as a function of the good’s underlying characteristics. This is the
theory set out by Rosen in his landmark 1974 paper which serves as the basis for hedonic
estimations across a wide variety of economic fields. The key assumption necessary to apply a
hedonic framework is the existence a single market with a basket of differentiated, heterogenous
goods. When this market is combined with producers who profit maximize and consumers who
maximize utility, the equilibrium price of each good can be separated into each underlying
characteristic. It is essential that these utility-bearing characteristics be objectively quantifiable
across all examined goods in order to ensure consistent outcomes.
Because Rosen (1974) set out to define a broad hedonic framework and each application
of the model requires customization, the paper provided only general empirical implications.
Ultimately, Rosen concluded that hedonic pricing models are broadly applicable to situations
with cross sectional data sets and equilibrium (Rosen, 1974). The ski industry is well suited for a
hedonic pricing model due to a consistent array of cross-sectional, quality defining statistics
available on each ski area along with a market that is clearly comprised of heterogeneous goods.
The heterogeneity comes from each ski area’s varied physical terrain coupled with differentiated
infrastructure levels. An area of the literature that where the hedonic price model has seen a solid
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amount of traction is the real estate industry. Bin et al. (2011) sought to estimate the impact of
rising sea levels on coastal property in North Carolina using data on housing characteristics and
predicted future sea levels. They found that by 2030, the four counties they examined would see
close to $200 million in property losses, assuming a mid-range rise in seas levels. Hicks and
Queen (2016) examined regions in Virginia with significant historical sites in order to ascertain
if these sites impacted residential property values. They found that living in proximity to an
open-space historical site is valuable to homeowners, however living directly adjacent to one is a
detrimental due to increased tourism traffic. These papers demonstrate the broad applicability of
the hedonic price model.

3.3

Ticket Pricing Models
Investigations of the determinants of lift ticket specific pricing began in the 1980s, with

one of earliest papers being Walsh et al. (1983). The paper’s core framework revolves around a
contingent valuation method with a linear stepwise least squares approach that determines skiers’
willingness to pay for lift tickets as a function of congestion effects, income, skier days, and
other socioeconomic variables. The study focused on three Colorado resorts of varying size and
terrain and found that skiers were willing to pay more for resorts that had better infrastructure
such as high-speed lifts and valued less crowded slopes. This is logical since minimizing time
spent in lift lines and riding lifts results in additional time actually skiing, which is the primary
reason consumers are at the resort in the first place. Because of the narrow three resort sample
and ski infrastructure improvements since the 1980s, there is ample room to expand and update
the data set.
Mulligan and Llinares (2003) recognized these infrastructure upgrades and decided to
investigate the impact of additional high-speed lifts on the willingness of firms to adopt this new

12

technology. They found that avid skiers thoroughly enjoy the additional skiing time it gives
them. However, the high initial capital costs needed to install the lifts have prevented many local
resorts from making the investments, leaving them unable to compete for skiers who demand the
new amenities. This paper is a somewhat simple analysis since it only focused on a single
determinate of skier demand, but nonetheless is a good window into another pitfall affecting
smaller ski areas that lack the same access to capital as conglomerates.
Falk (2011) further studied ski area price differences, specifically in the European
market. His data set covers 214 ski resorts in France, Switzerland, and Austria over the
2010/2011 ski season and included standard resort statistic variables such as size and altitude of
the ski area, lift quality, and snowmaking. Two additional unique variables are a dummy for the
ski area’s inclusion in a greater ski network and a dummy for whether the ski area is a recent
World Cup ski racing venue.5 Using a linear OLS hedonic price model with a natural log applied
to the dependent ticket price variable, the paper found that prices are significantly lower for areas
in France compared to the other two neighboring Alps countries. He determined this difference
was not simply due to French resorts having lower costs and theorizes that consumers simply
value Swiss and Austrian skiing more and are therefore willing to pay more. Because these are
European countries with unique ski cultures and consumer bases, it is not particularly feasible to
extrapolate the findings to US ski resorts. The OLS hedonic method and ski resort statistic
variables used are the most beneficial aspects for building this paper’s empirical model.
Moving onto North American focused research, Fonner and Berrens (2014) compiled a
cross-sectional data set of 181 US ski areas during the 2011-2012 season in order to explore

5
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13

which characteristics are the most important in determining ticket prices. These characteristics
include mountain statistics such as acreage and vertical drop, annual snowfall, lift capacity and
quality, nearby lodging, and levels of crowding. For the empirical estimation, a linear hedonic
OLS price model is used with multiple specifications run both with and without logs applied.
This linear model was determined to be the best fit after running a two-sided Box-Cox test. The
results demonstrate that skiers are willing to spend more for resorts that have greater amounts of
terrain available and that are located at higher altitudes. There are also positive effects for the
presence of on-site lodging along with having upgraded infrastructure such as high-speed
chairlifts and snowmaking capability. These findings are all consistent with the previous
literature and demonstrate that consumers value ski areas that are likely to have snow along with
modern amenities. Fonner and Berrens (2014) provided the most relevant empirical framework
and data set for this paper. Two potential areas for improvement in this paper, however, are the
addition of ownership dummy variables and expanding the data set to include Canadian ski
areas. Canadian ski areas are close substitutes for many American resorts and are therefore
relevant to this study. Because of the increased consolidation in the industry and changing
business models, the ownership of each ski area must also be accounted for. This paper will
include data on Canadian ski areas along with dummy variables for Vail, Alterra, and
miscellaneous ownership groups.

3.4

Weather Factors
Unlike many sports and activities, skiing is relatively unique due to its heavy dependence

on weather to provide optimal conditions. While some shortcomings can be overcome through
artificial snowmaking, ultimately a ski area cannot function without natural snow. Englin and
Moeltner (2004) developed an empirical demand model for winter sports trips that quantifies the
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value of snowfall to skiers and snowboarders. This paper used cross sectional behavioral data on
college students in the late 90s that skied in Nevada and California, along with statistics on the
mountains they were skiing on. These ski area statistics are helpful for determining which
variables are most likely to impact ticket prices.
The authors use a semi-log form equation to determine the actual demand for skiers and
snow boarders. The results indicate that beginner and advanced terrain types are the most highly
valued, snowfall increases trip demand at a decreasing rate, and lower temperatures and more
snow are preferred. One extra inch of snow at a resort receiving an average of one foot of snow
per week results in expected demand increasing by 1.8%. Another interesting finding is that
demand is more responsive to changes in ticket prices than changes in snow. While these results
are great for gaining insight into what motivates skiers to ski, the demand estimation equation is
not particularly helpful for determining the effect snowfall has on ticket prices.
Beaudin and Huang (2014) shifted away from individual decision making to determining
firm exit decisions due to weather conditions for firms in the New England ski industry. A 37year data set is used that covers 78 ski resorts in the region, of which 47 discontinued operations.
A discrete time survival analysis is used to determine the probability that a given resort will shut
down. There are some new variables not seen in other studies, including the distance to the
nearest metropolitan area, the proximity to lakes (necessary for snowmaking), and whether the
resort is open for all four seasons (e.g. biking in the summer). Some of the key findings are that
larger ski areas are less likely to close, increased snowfall and availability of snowmaking both
decrease the likelihood of closing, and that four-season operation has no effect. What this has
meant for the industry is that ski areas owned by corporations with easy access to capital have
thrived while many smaller resorts have either gone out of business or been acquired by one of
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the conglomerates. This paper reinforces the idea that weather conditions and access to urban
areas have a large impact on ski areas. Additionally, the large resort finding sheds light on the
increased consolidation in the industry and provides additional incentive to determine the true
impact of this consolidation. This paper studies a narrow geographic region and, as such, may
not be generalizable to all of the North American ski market. The data set also relies on officially
reported annual snowfall totals which are susceptible to exaggeration and may not accurately
reflect true weather conditions.

3.5

Estimations of Skier Demand
Moving past weather dependent analyses, an early paper that attempted to estimate skier

demand and served as the foundation for many following papers is Morey (1984). It set out to
find a better model for determining skier demand than the hodgepodge of confusing existing
methods. The paper used a single equation estimation model that determines demand as a
function of the ski area characteristics, skiing ability, and costs. This became the new standard
and every demand estimation paper since has followed a similar path. Falk (2015) estimated an
empirical demand model for skiing using a panel data set for resorts in the French Alps. The
variables cover 18 years and include skier visitation statistics, weather measurements, and
country specific economic data for resorts owned by the CDA group.
The empirical model used a log-linear form with natural logs applied to national income,
relative price ratio, and average natural snow depth. An interesting finding was that snowfall in
urban backyards had a higher impact on skier visits than snowfall at the resorts. They also found
that a 53% decrease in snow depth compared to the 40-year average would only decrease visits
by 1.8%. This paper found that the overall demand for skiing has a low sensitivity to changes in
real income and prices. Snowfall measurement occurring via weather stations not located directly
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adjacent to every resort is a potential error, meaning there is a possibility that the actual
conditions experienced by skiers are not quantified. This paper reinforces the set of ski area
characteristics necessary to quantify what skiers’ value, however it focuses on a narrow sample
of single-owner European resorts and did not directly address the issue of ticket prices.

3.6

Market Dynamics in the Ski Industry
The European and North American ski industries have little in common in terms of

organizational structure and, as mentioned previously, the dynamics in the North American ski
industry have shifted significantly over the past decade. European operators generally own only
the physical ski infrastructure and not the surrounding property and services while consumers
have a wider variety of easily accessible options due to many ski areas’ proximity to urban zones
and other resorts. Falk (2009) investigated the differences in efficiency between multi-resort
conglomerates and independent owners with a focus on the U.S., Canadian, Swiss, and French
ski markets. Falk hypothesized that corporate owners have greater access to capital and
economies of scale, which makes them more efficient. One interesting variable not seen in other
papers is the proximity to an international airport. A stochastic frontier production model
simultaneously estimated with determinants of inefficiency is used with natural logs applied to
the variables length of slopes and vertical lift capacity. This paper finds that only one of the
corporations looked at, Intrawest, was more efficient than the independent resorts.6 Falk (2009)
also found that as distance from an international airport increases, resort efficiency decreases.
The paper has good insights into the impact multi-resort owners have on operations, however
there has been a massive amount of consolidation in the industry since 2009 which may have led
to more efficient corporate owners.

6

Intrawest and its resorts are now wholly owned by Alterra Mountain Company.
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Mulligan (2011) looked at this changing industry makeup using a two-sector Endogenous
Fixed Cost model. His data set ranged from 1980 to 2002 and included 15 US states where
information was available on skier visits, number of people who can be transported 1000 vertical
feet per hour (VTFH), ticket prices, and ticket pricing method used. The paper found that
Vermont and New Hampshire resorts increased VTFH capacity by roughly 70% over the 22
years while real ticket prices rose 43%. When compared to a state like Utah where VTFH
capacity increased by 136% and prices by 92%, these numbers appear relatively small. The
author theorized that cheap airfare has increased accessibility to higher quality skiing states such
as Utah, with the resulting additional demand enabling them to raise prices faster. This paper’s
key contribution is the separation it makes between geographic markets and the clear ability for
markets that attract skiers from across the country to raise prices faster. However, the paper
could benefit from an updated data set due to the aforementioned industry consolidation along
with continued decreases in airfare prices. Because many of the larger, corporate owned resorts
are in the west and depend on out-of-state skiers, it will be important to determine if
concentrated industry ownership has led to increased pricing power.
As a whole, my paper expands the existing body of literature in a number of ways. Using
Fonner and Berrens (2014) as a baseline, it broadens the geographic market to include Canadian
ski areas along with those in the US since the two markets share consumers and ownership
groups. Similar to Falk (2009), this paper accounts for the ownership of each ski area, however it
adds an up-to-date data set solely focused on the North American market. Two other sets of
variables, season pass pricing and multi-area season pass inclusion, are completely novel
additions to the literature but are key to understanding the current ski industry due to the
prevalence of season pass products. This paper’s regressions also include controls for state fixed
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effects, another element that has not been previously seen in the literature, which reduces
potential error from unobservable differences between states that could impact pricing.

4

Data
This paper utilizes a unique cross-sectional data set covering 120 ski areas over the

2018/2019 ski season. The data was manually collected from a combination of official and thirdparty ski websites as there are no publicly available industry wide data sets. The data is
organized into four categories; ski area statistics, snowfall measurements, ticket pricing and
passes, and ownership. The shortened variable names used in the regression models are included
in parentheses. Data collection occurred in early 2019. Summary statistics are available in Table
1.

4.1

Ski Area Statistics
These statistics are the fixed elements of a ski area that determine the quality of the ski

experience. They are critical variables that control for differences between each mountain
because skiers’ value the type and quality of terrain and infrastructure. All ski area statistics are
compiled from OnTheSnow.com, a website that aggregates official data on ski areas.
Base (base). This variable is the lowest point of the ski area, measured in feet. Higher
altitude ski areas generally receive more consistent snowfall and retain snowpack better as a
result of colder temperatures. Lower elevation ski areas are generally more susceptible to warmer
temperatures. Identical to the corresponding variable seen in Fonner and Berrens (2014).
Vertical Rise (vert). This variable is the difference between peak and base, measured in
feet. A ski area with more vertical rise is generally more desirable as it increases the length of
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skiable terrain per lift ride. Identical to the corresponding variable seen in Fonner and Berrens
(2014).
Skiable Acres (acres). This variable is the total area of in-bounds terrain available at the
ski area, measured in acres.7 Larger mountains are desirable as they provide additional ski
options and reduced crowding. Identical to the corresponding variable seen in Fonner and
Berrens (2014).
Snow Making Acres (snowmke). This variable is the total area of terrain able to be
supplemented with artificial snow making, measured in acres. Increased snow making coverage
lessens the impact of variable natural snow conditions, especially during the early months of the
season and throughout poor snow years. Seen in Fonner and Berrens (2014) as a dummy variable
but expanded here to include precise acreage numbers for greater differentiation between ski
areas.
Lifts (lifts). This variable is the total number of operational lifts at each ski area. The
variable accounts for all types of uphill transportation, including chair lifts, gondolas, T-bars, and
magic carpets.8
High-Speed Lifts (hslifts). This variable is the proportion of total lifts that are classified as
high-speed. A high-speed lift is defined as a chairlift where individual chairs detach from the
main cable during loading and unloading, allowing for the main cable to reach higher speeds.
High-speed lifts are generally favored by skiers as they reduce time spent waiting in lines and
physically on the lift. Identical to the corresponding variable seen in Fonner and Berrens (2014)
and Falk (2011).

7
8

In-bounds refers to terrain within the official boundary of the ski area and monitored by ski patrollers.
Magic carpets are short, conveyor belt style lifts for beginners.
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Gondolas (gndla). This is a dummy variable that equals one if the ski area has at least one
gondola or tram and zero if none exist. Gondolas reflect a significant capital investment for the
ski area and provide higher uphill capacity while keeping skiers protected from the elements.
Identical to the corresponding variable seen in Fonner and Berrens (2014).
Trails (trails). This variable is the total number of ski trails at each ski area. A greater
number of trails provides skiers with more options to fit their preferred terrain type and reduces
crowding. Some ski areas artificially inflate their trail numbers by separately naming different
sections of a single continuous run, however this a small proportion of overall trails. Identical to
the corresponding variable seen in Fonner and Berrens (2014).
Region (region). This is a dummy variable that equals one if the ski area is located in
western North American and zero if it is located in eastern North America. A western ski area is
defined as one located in the Rocky Mountains or further west and an eastern ski area is anything
to the east of the Rocky Mountains. The Rockies serve as the border between east and west
because they represent a significant change in topography in North America.

4.2

Snowfall Measurements
Snowfall is the key determinate of skiing conditions and, as such, skiers are keenly aware

of the quantity of snow their ski area receives. For marketing purposes, ski areas usually place
their official snow stakes in a location on the mountain that consistently receives good snow.
This can result in upwardly skewed estimates of snowfall that may not accurately represent
actual conditions. In order to control for this, this paper’s regressions include both official and
independent snowfall data. Official data is available for all 120 ski areas in the data set and is
collected from OnTheSnow.com. Independent data is available for 79 ski areas in the data set
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and is collected from BestSnow.net, a website that formulates and compiles detailed snow
statistics using public weather stations located nearby ski areas.
Official Annual Snowfall (SAS_OFC). This variable is the average annual snowfall over
the course of a full ski season officially reported by each ski area, measured in inches. There is
no industry standard for this statistic and each individual ski area is responsible for providing the
number. Identical to the corresponding variable seen in Fonner and Berrens (2014).
Independent Annual Snowfall (SAS_IDP). This variable is the average annual snowfall
calculated by BestSnow.net, measured in inches. The average is obtained through the use of
“extensive monthly statistics compiled for avalanche forecasting,” which enables the site to
“project reliable seasonal averages for the period November 1 through April 30” (BestSnow.net).
Season Standard Deviation Snowfall (stdev). This variable is the standard deviation of
independent average snowfall, measured in inches. Ski areas with higher standard deviations
receive less consistent snowfall from year to year. This variable is collected from BestSnow.net
Percent of Days with 6+ in. Powder Days (per6in). This variable is the percent of days
between December and March with a minimum of six inches of fresh snow. A higher percentage
means skiers are more likely to experience powder type conditions, which is generally a positive.
This variable is collected from BestSnow.net.

4.3

Ticket Pricing and Passes
As discussed in Section 2, the North American ski industry features a wide variety of

ticket options and pricing schemes. This paper measures prices using single-day tickets and
season passes. Full day ticket prices do not include any discounts for purchasing online or in
advance. These discounts are excluded because they vary significantly between ski areas. Season
pass prices also exclude early purchase discounts for similar reasons. Both day ticket and season
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pass price data was collected from OnTheSnow.com, and limited instances of missing data were
collected directly from official ski area websites. Ticket prices in Canadian dollars were
converted to US dollars at a market rate of 0.7512 USD/CAD, a midday quote on March 14th,
2019.
Full Day Price (dayprice). This variable is the price of a single-day ticket purchased at
the full window rate, measured in USD. Excludes all online and advance purchase discounts.
Identical to the corresponding variable seen in Fonner and Berrens (2014).
Full Day Price – Log (log_dayprice). This variable is the log transformed version of full
day price. It decreases the standard deviation of the variable and reinterprets the regression result
in expected change form.
Season Pass Price (sznprice). This variable is the price of a season pass to the ski area,
measured in USD. In order for a pass to qualify as season-long it must provide unlimited access
to the ski area with no blackout dates or other skiing restrictions.9 Excludes all advance purchase
discounts.
Season Pass Price – Log (log_sznprice). This variable is the log transformed version of
season pass price. It decreases the standard deviation of the variable and reinterprets the
regression result in expected change form.
Epic Pass (epic). This is a dummy variable that equals one if the ski area is included on
the Epic Pass and zero if not included. The Epic Pass must include unlimited days at the ski area
to qualify.
Ikon Pass (ikon). This is a dummy variable that equals one if the ski area is included on
the Ikon Pass and zero if not included. The Ikon Pass must include unlimited days at the ski area

9

Blackout dates are high-visitor periods (holidays) where some passholder tiers are restricted from skiing.
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to qualify.
Multi-Area Season Pass (multi_area). This is a dummy variable that equals one if the ski
area is included on any multi-area pass and zero if it is not. If the Epic or Ikon pass variables
equal one, this variable will also equal one.

4.4

Ownership
The ownership dummy variables quantify the aforementioned industry consolidation. A

ski area is considered owned by a conglomerate if the ownership group owns two or more ski
areas. Ownership is further classified by specific ownership company. Vail and Alterra, as the
two largest players, receive individual dummy variables, and miscellaneous conglomerates
excluding those two receive their own individual dummy. Ownership was verified by comparing
each resort to a master list of multi-area owners compiled by the NSAA. These variables are
similar to the measure of ownership used in Falk (2009).
Owned by Conglomerate (cong). This is a dummy variable that equals one if the ski area
is owned by a conglomerate and zero if it is not. If any of the following three dummy variables
equal one, this variable will also equal one.
Owned by Vail (vail). This is a dummy variable that equals one if the ski area is owned
by Vail Resorts and zero if it is not.
Owned by Alterra (altra). This is a dummy variable that equals one if the ski area is
owned by Alterra Mountain Company. and zero if it is not.
Owned by Miscellaneous (misc). This is a dummy variable that equals one if the ski area
is owned by a conglomerate that is not Vail or Alterra and zero if it is not.
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4.5

Summary Statistics
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable
Ski Area Statistics
Base
Vertical Rise
Skiable Acres
Snow Making Acres
Lifts
High-Speed Lifts
Gondolas
Trails
Region of North America
Snowfall Measurements
Official Average Snowfall
Independent Average Snowfall
Season Std. Dev. Snowfall
% Days w/ 6+ in. Pow Days
Ticket Pricing & Passes
Full Day Price
Full Day Price - Log
Season Pass Price
Season Pass Price - Log
Epic Pass
Ikon Pass
Multi-Area Season Pass
Ownership
Owned by Conglomerate
Owned by Vail
Owned by Alterra
Owned by Miscellaneous

N

Mean Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120

5,565
2,344
1,686
282.0
12.07
0.245
0.367
92.39
0.733

2,962
984.2
1,512
388.2
7.341
0.186
0.484
54.43
0.444

118
700
50
0
3
0
0
2
0

10,800
5,620
8,171
3,379
41
0.727
1
341
1

120
80
79
79

298.5
307.0
81.15
0.125

131.9
106.3
35.78
0.0433

31
669
107
652
20
181
0.0430 0.268

120
120
120
120
120
120
120

99.58
4.518
971.3
6.787
0.117
0.117
0.233

40.97
0.414
448.9
0.424
0.322
0.322
0.425

35
3.555
299
5.700
0
0
0

209
5.342
2,450
7.804
1
1
1

120
120
120
120

0.400
0.117
0.142
0.142

0.492
0.322
0.350
0.350

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

Summary statistics for the complete data set are available above in Table 1. On average,
official annual snowfall is 8.5 inches lower than independent annual snowfall. However, these
two averages are not directly comparable as independent observations do not cover the full 120
ski area data set. When focusing specifically on ski areas for which both official and independent
data is available, official annual snowfall is an average of 26 inches higher than the independent
metric. This confirms the commonly held notion that ski areas tend to overreport snowfall totals.
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Of the 120 ski areas in the data set, 40% are owned by a conglomerate and 23.3% are included
on a multi-area season pass. Due to the wide variety of ski areas and terrain included in the
sample, many ski area statistic variables have proportionally large standard deviations. The day
ticket and season pass price variables also have large standard deviations, but the log
transformed versions effectively eliminate this issue.
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Ownership
Congl.
Vail
Alterra
Mean SD
Mean SD
Mean SD

Misc.
Variable
Mean SD
Ski Area Statistics
Base
5,694 3,091
6,546 3,149
5,933 2,716
4,754 3,315
Vertical Rise
2,658 972.5
2,934 909.8
2,627 1,037
2,461 959.5
Skiable Acres
2,085 1,860
3,155 2,404
1,603 1,300
1,686 1,535
Snow Making Acres
447.5 520.5
740.2 841.3
338.1 261.1
316 215.8
Lifts
16.62 9.026
21.50 9.630
15.18 7.477
14.06 8.835
High-Speed Lifts
0.324 0.176
0.340 0.188
0.382 0.143
0.253 0.181
Gondolas
0.521 0.505
0.643 0.497
0.588 0.507
0.353 0.493
Trails
114.9 66.39
148.4 73.56
90.82 52.05
111.5 65.06
Region of North America 0.750 0.438
0.857 0.363
0.765 0.437
0.647 0.493
Snowfall Measurements
Official Average Snowfall 296.7 111.3
332.1 75.36
266.5 118.6
297.8 124.9
Idp. Average Snowfall
294.8 88.20
311.5 84.75
304.7 89.69
269 91.16
Season Std. Dev. Snowfall 79.21 34.96
87.08 37.55
83
37.73
67.85 28.86
% Days w/ 6+ in. Pow Day 0.119 0.0361 0.125 0.0367 0.123 0.0356 0.109 0.0368
Ticket Pricing & Passes
Full Day Price
126.0 43.56
145.9 40.71
137.9 44.20
97.70 30.38
Full Day Price - Log
4.774 0.367
4.945 0.293
4.869 0.366
4.537 0.311
Season Pass Price
1,133 473.9
949
0
1,293 673.9
1,124 385.4
Season Pass Price - Log
6.962 0.364
6.855
0
7.054 0.467
6.959 0.391
Epic Pass
0.292 0.459
1
0
0
0
0
0
Ikon Pass
0.271 0.449
0
0
0.647 0.493
0.118 0.332
Multi-Area Season Pass
0.562 0.501
1
0
0.647 0.493
0.118 0.332
Note: Number of observations for Congl.: 48, Vail: 14, Alterra: 17, Misc.: 17.
Summary statistics specifically for ski areas owned by conglomerates are available above
in Table 2. Key areas of divergence from the full sample focus on day ticket and season pass
prices. Conglomerates average $126 for a day ticket, a $26.42 premium over the full sample,
while Vail and Alterra command even higher premiums of $46.32 and $38.32, respectively.
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Season pass price differences are considerably more mixed, with Vail passes costing $22.30 less
than the full sample, whereas Alterra and miscellaneous conglomerates charge a premium of
$321.70 and $152.7, respectively. This disparity is a result of Vail including all of its ski areas on
the Epic Pass while Alterra and other conglomerates restrict some of their most popular resorts to
single-area season passes that are considerably more expensive.

5

Methodology
The core empirical framework utilized in this paper is a hedonic price model, as

seen most closely in Fonner and Berrens (2014). The regressions follow a linear OLS format
with price as the dependent variable. Although a basic model, Fonner and Berrens (2014) note
that this empirical method is best suited to hedonic price estimation when it is not possible to
obtain a complete data set of underlying attributes. A key variable missing from this paper is
annual skier visits because the vast majority of ski areas are privately held and do not publicly
disclose that number. Skier visits are a clear indicator of overall demand which inherently
impacts ticket price. Therefore, a linear OLS regression is the best specification for this paper.
The independent variables are shared between all equations and represent a mix of
established variables seen in the literature along with additions unique to this paper. Vert, Base,
Acres, Lifts, HSlifts, Gndla, and Trails are all standard mountain statistic and quality variables
used by Fonner and Berrens (2014) and Falk (2006). Fonner and Berrens (2014) quantify the
existence of snowmaking at a ski area with a dummy variable while this paper adds further detail
by breaking out Snowmke into the number of acres covered by snowmaking equipment. The key
differentiating independent variable is Congl which enables this paper to investigate the impact
of oligopolistic competition. Price serves as both the day ticket price and the season pass price.
An additional point of expansion beyond Fonner and Berrens (2014) is the inclusion of Canadian
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ski areas in the sample. Due to the ease of cross-border access between the US and Canada and
similarity of ownership structure, it is logical to include both countries.

𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒& = 𝛽) + 𝛽+ 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑡+& + 𝛽. 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒.& + 𝛽2 𝑆𝐴𝑆_𝑂𝐹𝐶2& + 𝛽9 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠9& + 𝛽: 𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑘𝑒:& +
𝛽@ 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠@& + 𝛽C 𝐻𝑆𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠C& + 𝛽F 𝐺𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑎F& + 𝛽I 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠I& + 𝛽+) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑙+)& + 𝜏M + 𝜀&

(1)

𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒& = 𝛽) + 𝛽+ 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑡+& + 𝛽. 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒.& + 𝛽2 𝑆𝐴𝑆_𝐼𝐷𝑃2& + 𝛽9 𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣9& + 𝛽: 𝑃𝑒𝑟6𝑖𝑛:& +
𝛽@ 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠@& + 𝛽C 𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑘𝑒C& + 𝛽F 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠F& + 𝛽I 𝐻𝑆𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠I& + 𝛽+) 𝐺𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑎+)& + 𝛽++ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠++& +
𝛽+. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑙+.& + 𝜏M + 𝜀&

(2)

In order to account for differences between official and independent snowfall metrics,
two broad regression categories are used. Equation (1) uses SAS_OFC as the snowfall variable
and includes no additional weather variables. Equation (2) uses SAS_IDP as the snowfall
variable and includes StDev along with Per6in. The inclusion of additional snowfall variables
controls for conditions that change substantially from year to year and skiers’ preference for
consistent fresh snow.

𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒& = 𝛽) + 𝛽+ 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑡+& + 𝛽. 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒.& + 𝛽2 𝑆𝐴𝑆_𝑂𝐹𝐶2& + 𝛽9 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠9& + 𝛽: 𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑘𝑒:& +
𝛽@ 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠@& + 𝛽C 𝐻𝑆𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠C& + 𝛽F 𝐺𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑎F& + 𝛽I 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠I& + 𝛽+) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑙+)& + 𝛽++ 𝐸𝑝𝑖𝑐++& +
𝛽+. 𝐼𝑘𝑜𝑛+.& + 𝜏M + 𝜀&

(3)

𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒& = 𝛽) + 𝛽+ 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑡+& + 𝛽. 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒.& + 𝛽2 𝑆𝐴𝑆_𝑂𝐹𝐶2& + 𝛽9 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠9& + 𝛽: 𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑘𝑒:& +
𝛽@ 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠@& + 𝛽C 𝐻𝑆𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠C& + 𝛽F 𝐺𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑎F& + 𝛽I 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠I& + 𝛽+) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑙+)& + 𝛽++ 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖_𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠++& +
𝜏M + 𝜀&

(4)
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Equations (3) and (4) are functionally identical to equation (1) but also include dummy
variables that account for multi-area season passes. Equation (3) utilizes the Epic and Ikon
dummy variables in order to identify the impacts each of the two major multi-area passes have
on ticket prices. Equation (4) only utilizes the Multi_pass dummy which enables the regression
to look at impacts from general multi-area season pass inclusion. These dummy variables are
another key area of improvement over the existing literature as multi-area season passes are a
recent innovation in the industry that now make up a significant portion of overall season pass
sales.
An additional area of improvement over the previous literature is the inclusion of controls
for state fixed effects, as represented in the above four equations by 𝜏M . This enables the
regressions to control for unobservable differences between the states and provinces in which the
ski areas are located that could impact ticket pricing. A couple key areas of potential difference
are state-level liability regulations and the local ski culture. In the US, each state is responsible
for legislation regarding the level of liability that ski area operators incur when an accident takes
place on their property. These regulations vary significantly between states, meaning practically
identical accidents can have different legal consequences depending on the location (Chalat,
1996). Controlling for these differences is important because it is reasonable to assume that the
cost of liability insurance fluctuates between states and that this cost is most likely passed to
consumers through ticket prices. The local ski culture is also hard to quantify yet can influence a
variety of crucial factors. Skiing is a social activity for many people, so the local community
surrounding the sport can influence how committed a consumer might be to skiing. This, in turn,
could impact the price elasticity of demand for ski tickets, which further solidifies the
importance of controlling for state fixed effects.
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Due to the similarities in the empirical framework and overlap of variables, I expect the
signs and general coefficients to be consistent between this paper and Fonner and Berrens
(2014). All of the ski area statistic and snowfall measurement variables should have a positive
impact on ticket prices since skiers’ value higher quality mountains that receive large amounts of
snow. Conglomerate owned ski areas should increase both day ticket and season pass prices,
however those on multi-area season passes should see season pass price decreases due to the
undercutting strategy that is employed.

6

Results
Table 3 reports the full results of the OLS regression. Using regression (1) with official

annual snowfall, a conglomerate owned ski area prices a single day ticket $15.50 higher than an
independent ski area, all else equal. Using regression (2) with independent snowfall data returns
a similar result, with conglomerates commanding a $17.73 premium over independent areas, all
else equal. Compared to the average day ticket price from the sample of $99.58, these
coefficients represent roughly 15% to 17% of the total ticket price. These positive price
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level for regressions (1) and (2). When looking
at regressions (3) and (4) that use season pass price as the dependent variable, all else equal, a
conglomerate will price its season passes $205 and $201 above independent ski areas,
respectively. The season pass results are significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Because the regressions with independent snowfall metrics closely resemble the regressions with
official snowfall data, it appears that the overreporting problem is not particularly serious and
that previous papers are justified in using official data.
Other independent variables that return significant results are the three lift quality
variables along with the base altitude and vertical drop variables. Every additional foot in
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vertical drop adds about one cent to a day ticket price and slightly over thirty cents to a season
pass price. Regressions (1) and (2) find very slight negative coefficients for base altitude, which
is counter to the predicted sign. However, this significance disappears when season pass price is
the dependent variable. Total number of lifts, proportion of high-speed lifts, and gondolas all
positively impact day ticket price but similarly find little to no significance for season pass price.
The snowfall variables are generally insignificant which is consistent with the findings of Fonner
& Berrens (2014). In order to test for robustness, these regressions are also run excluding state
fixed effects and with log transformed versions of the dependent pricing variables. The results of
the log variable regressions are available in Table 6 and the regressions without fixed effects are
available in Table 7. The directions and significance of the coefficients remain consistent with
Table 3, indicating that the results are robust.
Regressions (5) through (8), available in Table 4, expand the analysis by adding dummy
variables that account for a ski area’s inclusion in a multi-area season pass. The regressions are
run both with the broad multi-area pass variable and individual Epic and Ikon pass variables.
Using day ticket price as the dependent variable, regressions (5) and (6) find that all else equal,
conglomerate owned ski areas price tickets $11.58 and $11.57 higher than independent areas,
respectively. These results are consistent with regressions (1) and (2), although the magnitude of
the coefficients is slightly smaller. Where these additional variables provide the most value is in
regressions (7) and (8) where season pass price is the dependent variable. Both regressions find
at a 1% significance level that a conglomerate owned ski area will price a season pass $352
dollars above an independent area, all else equal. This is a significant premium as it represents
roughly 36% of the average season pass price in the sample. When looking at the multi-area
season pass dummy variables, the regressions find that a ski area included on one of these passes
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charges considerably less. Regression (7) finds that, all else equal, a ski area available on the
Epic Pass will charge $396 less while one on the Ikon Pass will charge $394 less. These
discounts are roughly equivalent to 40% of the average season pass price. The coefficients and
significance levels for the remaining independent variables are consistent with those in Table 3.
Intuitively, there may appear to be a disconnect between conglomerates commanding a
premium for season passes while multi-area season passes provide discounts since most ski areas
on multi-area passes are owned by conglomerates. However, a unique pass structuring decision
by Alterra can explain much of this divide. While Vail Resorts offers unlimited skiing at every
ski area it owns on the Epic Pass, Alterra chooses to cap the number of days on the Ikon Pass at
its most popular ski areas, such as the four Aspen mountains in Colorado and Deer Valley in
Utah.10 This means the Ikon Pass is not a true season pass for these conglomerate owned
mountains and that skiers would need to purchase a separate season pass for that mountain. A
2018/19 season pass for Deer Valley costs $2,365, which is over 240% higher than the average
season pass price in the sample. Because a group of conglomerate owned ski areas have these
extraordinarily expensive season passes, it is logical that there is a positive coefficient on the
conglomerate dummy while the ski areas with less expensive multi-area passes retain negative
coefficients.
Conglomerates’ decisions to price these multi-area passes at a discount is explained by
vertically integrated business models. By pricing day tickets above those of independent ski
areas, conglomerates incentivize skiers to purchase the relatively cheaper season passes. Even if
season passes are priced below cost, the conglomerate is able to make up the difference via
ancillary revenue from amenities such as transportation, food, and lodging. Vail Resorts finds

10

The Ikon Pass allows for a maximum of seven days at each of these ski areas, among others.

32

that skiers with season passes spend more days on the mountain each season than non-pass
holders, further increasing ancillary revenue (Vail Resorts Inc., 2018). Skiers who own multiresort season passes may also be incentivized to take trips to ski areas they do not traditionally
visit since they pay no additional costs for lift access, also increasing ancillary revenue for a
conglomerate. An additional aspect of multi-area season pass sales that enable conglomerates to
lower prices is the fact that the passes must be paid in full before the season begins. This means
consumers are effectively providing interest free loans to the conglomerate, lowering overall
financing costs for the company. The greater the pass sales, the greater the financing savings. As
reference, Vail Resorts collected over $410 million from season pass products in fiscal 2018
(Vail Resorts Inc., 2018).
The notable geographical differences between the eastern and western portions of North
America also warrant a region-specific analysis. Table 5 separates the regression results into
eastern and western regions but only utilizes official annual snowfall data. Independent snowfall
is excluded from this regression because the number of observations would not be sufficient to
obtain robust results. Regression (9) finds that out of all western-located ski areas in the sample,
conglomerate owned ski areas price single day tickets $15.61 higher than independent ski areas,
all else equal. This represents a premium of $4.04 over the comparable full sample estimation
from regression (6), implying that the conglomerates’ western ski areas possess elevated pricing
power. Regression (10), which focuses on eastern ski areas, does not find a statistically
significant increase for conglomerate owned ski areas. It is difficult to determine if this is due to
less pricing power in the region or simply a low number of observations for eastern ski areas.
Regressions (11) and (12), which use season pass price as the dependent variable, find that
conglomerates also possess more pricing power in the west. The coefficients on the
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conglomerates in the western region are roughly $16 lower than the non-region dependent
analysis and are equally as significant. When comparing the impacts of multi-are ski pass
inclusion, a western ski area on a multi-area pass will provide an additional $253 discount over a
similar eastern ski area. This is potentially explained by the expensive conglomerate owned ski
areas that are primarily located in the west.
In order to specifically investigate the impact of market concentration within the industry,
Table 8 includes further regressions that utilize a consolidated form of the data set. Instead of
each ski area being an independent data point, the data is collapsed at the state level so that each
state and province is a measure of all ski areas within the area. This serves as crude
approximation of market concentration but also severely diminishes the number of observations
to 23. Section 7 below includes a more thorough analysis regarding the difficulty in measuring
the North American ski industry’s market concentration. The results of the regressions are
generally consistent with previous regressions, however none of the key explanatory variables
are significant. One divergence is that the sign on conglomerate ownership is flipped when
season pass price is the dependent variable. It is unclear what causes this flip, but it is likely that
the small number of observations prevents the regression from finding any significant results.
Ultimately, the key takeaways from this paper show that the impact of consolidation
varies significantly across consumer and ownership groups. Starting off with skiers who
generally ski enough to warrant a season pass, those who can access ski areas on multi-area
passes will benefit significantly as a result of the discount these products provide. Season pass
skiers for which it is only feasible to access conglomerate owned or independent ski areas not on
a multi-area pass will not receive these economic benefits. Finally, day ticket purchasers at
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conglomerate-owned ski areas will see higher prices than independent areas regardless of their
multi-area pass inclusion.

7

Discussion & Conclusion
In light of this paper’s findings, there is not a universally applicable set of implications

for skiers. For any one individual, the impact of consolidated ownership depends largely on the
frequency and location of their skiing. The hundreds of thousands of skiers for which multi-area
season passes make sense are reaping hefty economic benefits in the form of prices that are
hundreds of dollars less than the equivalent single-area season pass. This is quite clearly a net
positive for consumers as it enables consistent skiers who have easy access to the mountains to
lower their fixed lift ticket costs while also increasing the quantity of ski areas they can visit.
This is also a positive development for the companies selling multi-area passes because a greater
percentage of prepaid season passes reduces exposure towards poor snow years where revenue
might otherwise decrease. However, skiers who visit the mountains less frequently and stick to
purchasing single-day tickets are not quite as fortunate and are subject to double-digit percent
premiums over independent ski areas. Even though this is a conscious decision on the part of
conglomerates to drive people toward more favorable season pass products, it is possible that the
expense will deter novice skiers from trying the sport. Novice skiers are more likely to buy day
tickets since they are learning and may not be willing to commit to a full season. As a sport that
currently sees stagnant visitation numbers, attracting new participants will be critical to the
future of industry.

7.1

Contributions
As a whole, this paper contributes five main points to the existing literature. First, it

expands the analysis of Fonner and Berrens (2014) to include Canadian ski areas. Canadian ski
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areas are generally substitutes for US ski areas as they share similar terrain types, have common
ownership groups in some cases, and the consumer base can travel between each country with
minimal hassle. Therefore, it makes sense to include Canadian ski areas in the data set. Second,
this paper includes variables that control for the ownership of each ski area. While Falk (2009)
explores the efficiency level of a select number of American and international resort operators,
this is the first paper that controls for ownership in respect to ticket prices in the North American
market. Because of the recent buying sprees from Vail Resorts and Alterra along with the
statistical significance for the conglomerate variable seen in this paper’s regressions, it will be
important to include a measure of ownership in future research on the subject. Third, this paper
expands the dependent pricing variable to also include season pass prices. Even though season
passes have historically been a sizeable portion of sales, most papers focused solely on day ticket
prices. Expanding the data set provides greater insights into what the entire skier base is
experiencing. Fourth, this paper includes variables that control for the inclusion of a ski area on a
multi-area season pass. With the increasing prevalence of these types of season pass products
within the industry, it is a critical explanatory factor of pass prices and should also be included
with any further research that looks at season pass price. Finally, this paper incorporates controls
for state fixed effects to account for unobservable differences between states and regions. Each
state and province included in the sample has individual regulations regarding the amount of
liability ski areas incur for accidents which results in varied insurance costs that are ultimately
passed to consumers. Additionally, the local ski culture is very much region dependent and has
the potential to impact demand elasticities. A fixed effect model has not been applied to any
previous ski-focused papers.
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7.2

Policy Implications
In terms of policy implications, this paper finds little evidence of antitrust concerns that

would warrant government intervention, although this sample data set only focuses on the most
recent ski season. The US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, which are
responsible for antitrust enforcement, utilize the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) when
determining market concentration within an industry. As a result of the two primary measures of
market share (skier visits and revenue) not being publicly information for most ski areas, it is
difficult to independently generate the HHI for the North American ski industry. IBISWorld
estimates that the top three firms are responsible for over 80% of industry wide revenue, but this
number is inexact due to the lack of public financial data (Hyland, 2018). Calculating the HHI
solely based off of the number of ski areas owned by each company would be highly unlikely to
find high levels of market concentration due to the large number of firms in the industry.11
A key point of contention in many antitrust cases revolves around the definition of the
market. In the case of ski areas, there is actually precedent regarding geographic market
determination involving a 1979 civil lawsuit filed against Aspen Skiing Co. (ASC) by Aspen
Highlands. Macher and Mayo (2010) analyze this case, which focuses on whether ASC, the
owner of three of the four Aspen area mountains, was exerting undue power over Highlands, the
owner of the fourth Aspen area mountain. After multiple rounds of appeals that ultimately went
as far as the Supreme Court, the relevant market was found to narrowly be the immediate Aspen
area and not the broader North American destination resort market. This decision was surprising
since it was seemingly at odds with the standard method of determining a geographic market

11

Vail Resorts, the largest operator in North America, owns 16 of 472 ski areas in the US and accounts for less than
16% of total annual skier visits (Vail Resorts, 2018).
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which is the ability of consumers who live far away from the area to switch to a different firm.12
Because out-of-town skiers have the ability to choose practically any ski area in the country, it is
reasonable to think that this standard logic applied to a modern day case would produce a ruling
counter to the Aspen case and find the market to be much broader. A broad market definition
would be favorable toward the current conglomerates as it lessens their overall market control.
Ultimately, the fact that many skiers have actually benefited from the consolidation via lower
season pass prices means there is a slim case for consumer harm that would necessitate antitrust
litigation.

7.3

Limitations
Due to a variety of factors, this paper does run into limitations that potentially impact its

results. A key point of missing data on ski areas is the annual skier visitation metric. While this
number is available for the North American industry as a whole, there is no publicly available
data set that breaks out annual visits by each individual ski area. To the author’s knowledge,
there is no modern paper on the North American ski industry that includes individual level
visitation numbers. Because the vast majority of ski areas are owned by private companies, it is
highly unlikely a comprehensive data set will ever become available. The number of people who
visit a ski area in a given year is a key determinant of overall demand and therefore prices, so
excluding it from the regressions potentially adds error to the results. The lack of public data also
prevents the calculation of market concentration measures which are important when examining
a consolidating industry. An additional aspect of the industry that this paper’s variables may not
accurately quantify is the variety of lift ticket pricing schemes. As discussed earlier, most ski

12

While the Supreme Court did not rule specifically on the geographic market definition, a justice called the lower
court’s geographic ruling “perfectly absurd” (Macher and Mayo, 2010).
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areas employ price discrimination techniques that alter the price of day lift tickets based on
factors such as the number of ski days you purchase or how early in advance you book. Because
these discounts and pricing schemes vary significantly across the sample, it is difficult to
consistently measure them. As a result, the day ticket prices included in the data set may not
accurately represent the true prices consumers are paying. When it comes to season pass
products, there are a similarly varied array of products available that each have their own unique
facets.

7.4

Future Research Topics
One feature of multi-area passes that future papers might explore is the inclusion of

partner resorts with a restricted number of days. These partner resorts theoretically provide value
to skiers and do incur costs for the pass provider, so it is likely they impact the overall price of
the season pass. Another avenue of future research should focus on how the increasingly
vertically integrated business models are impacting the “all in” price consumers are paying.
Conglomerates are not simply reducing multi-area season ticket prices for the benefit of skiers
and are largely making up the difference from ancillary revenue streams. An in-depth analysis of
this type would need to include detailed data on the prices of ski area amenities such as onmountain and off-mountain dining, lodging, and ski school lessons. This would enable a more
complete analysis of the industry that might be able to determine the true economic impact of the
consolidation on skiers. An analysis of this type is not unprecedented as Krautmann and Berri
(2007) examine the pricing schemes of MLB teams and find that it is feasible for profit
maximizers to price tickets in the inelastic portion of the demand curve in order to maximize
concessions revenue. Similarly to professional sports teams, ski areas have a low (or zero)
marginal cost of attendance, which means the lower season pass prices are an economically
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viable method of revenue maximization. Therefore, it is certainly possible that conglomerates are
ultimately extracting a much higher amount of consumer surplus than pure ticket prices suggest.
It is also likely that the industry will continue to consolidate over the coming years, which should
only further the examinations on this subject. A final area of further research should expand the
data set beyond a cross section to include a longer time frame, ideally stretching back to the early
2000s before much of the consolidation began. This would enable a difference-in-differences
empirical approach which could shed light on how pricing has adjusted as the industry has
shifted.

7.5

Conclusion
In summary, a spate of mergers and acquisitions within the ski industry over the past two

decades have shifted the competitive environment to such a degree that consumers are feeling the
impact. The unique data set in this paper coupled with an OLS hedonic price model added a
variety of contributions to the existing literature, largely centered around the inclusion of season
pass prices, multi-area passes, and ownership data. Ultimately, it found that conglomerates
charge premium prices for day tickets and season passes but that the availability of multi-area
season passes benefit consumers via comparably lower prices. This creates a dichotomy whereby
some skiers should be pleased with recent consolidation and others should feel negative
repercussions. As a result, it is difficult to draw any singular conclusions about the impact of
consolidation on the overall North American ski industry.
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Appendix
Table 3: OLS Regression Results

Variables
vert
base
sas_ofc
sas_idp
stdev
per6in
acres
snowmke
lifts
hslift
gndla
trails
congl
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Dependent Variable
Day Ticket Price
Season Pass Price
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.013***
0.009*
0.331*** 0.311***
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.063)
(0.083)
-0.006***
-0.008**
-0.021
-0.002
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.011)
(0.017)
0.025
-0.258
(0.022)
(0.407)
-0.171
-6.488*
(0.199)
(3.723)
-0.220
9.448*
(0.295)
(5.512)
665.346
10,068.415
(469.957)
(8,777.456)
-0.004
-0.004
-0.113**
-0.114*
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.049)
(0.064)
0.002
0.001
-0.015
0.014
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.111)
(0.132)
1.437***
1.252**
2.189
-2.432
(0.534)
(0.616)
(9.759)
(11.499)
29.436**
35.949*
428.846*
555.784
(13.904)
(18.504)
(254.011) (345.605)
14.858**
16.466**
-9.141
95.162
(5.655)
(6.333)
(103.312) (118.285)
0.042
0.065
-1.063
-0.864
(0.088)
(0.102)
(1.614)
(1.899)
15.497*** 17.732*** 204.756** 200.781*
(4.715)
(5.925)
(86.133) (110.671)
103.220*** 121.453***
534.392
429.778
(21.560)
(36.034)
(393.894) (673.016)
120
0.855

79
0.882

120
0.596

79
0.653

Notes: All regressions include state fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: OLS Regression Results with Multi-Area Season Pass Variables

Variables
vert
base
sas_ofc
acres
snowmke
lifts
hslift
gndla
trails
cong
epic
ikon
multi_pass
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Dependent Variable
Day Ticket Price
Season Pass Price
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
0.014***
0.014***
0.292***
0.292***
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.060)
(0.060)
-0.006*** -0.006***
-0.016
-0.016
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.037)
(0.036)
0.024
0.024
-0.244
-0.244
(0.022)
(0.022)
(0.380)
(0.378)
-0.005*
-0.005*
-0.092**
-0.092**
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.046)
(0.046)
0.001
0.000
0.052
0.051
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.109)
(0.105)
1.462***
1.462***
1.237
1.237
(0.531)
(0.528)
(9.125)
(9.072)
28.357**
28.569**
461.205*
461.431*
(13.851)
(13.749)
(238.033)
(236.192)
13.838**
14.087**
19.609
19.874
(5.726)
(5.606)
(98.393)
(96.299)
0.028
0.025
-0.450
-0.453
(0.089)
(0.088)
(1.525)
(1.508)
11.577**
11.566**
352.527*** 352.516***
(5.198)
(5.169)
(89.328)
(88.804)
9.406
-395.955***
(7.472)
(128.409)
11.340
-393.897***
(6.902)
(118.606)
10.503*
-394.788***
(5.983)
(102.785)
103.374*** 103.215***
534.746
534.577
(21.434)
(21.307)
(368.337)
(366.025)
120
0.860

120
0.860

120
0.655

120
0.655

Notes: All regressions include state fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0 .05, * p < 0 .1.
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Table 5: OLS Regression Results by Region

Variables
vert
base
sas_ofc
acres
snowmke
lifts
hslift
gndla
trails
cong
multi_pass
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Dependent Variable
Day Ticket Price
Season Pass Price
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
West
East
West
East
0.011*** 0.006
0.297***
-0.037
(0.004)
(0.011)
(0.073)
(0.121)
-0.005** -0.003
-0.013
0.025
(0.002)
(0.010)
(0.041)
(0.110)
0.025
0.111
-0.292
1.925
(0.023)
(0.105)
(0.436)
(1.194)
-0.006*
-0.001
-0.114**
0.035
(0.003)
(0.007)
(0.055)
(0.081)
-0.001
0.068
0.046
0.789
(0.006)
(0.041)
(0.118)
(0.466)
1.466**
-1.882
-0.992
13.191
(0.590)
(1.792)
(11.101)
(20.366)
44.956*** 13.167
536.958* 555.903**
(16.408) (21.386)
(308.715) (243.091)
19.783*** -7.028
76.780
-23.988
(7.334) (11.120)
(137.994) (126.398)
0.042
0.250
0.072
-3.756
(0.093)
(0.323)
(1.750)
(3.674)
15.607** 0.201
368.309***
99.047
(5.959) (10.745)
(112.111) (122.137)
3.916
25.167* -434.398*** -181.996
(6.733) (11.447)
(126.682) (130.117)
96.907*** 37.702
482.768
323.847
(21.874) (70.651)
(411.557) (803.065)
88
0.877

32
0.895

88
0.668

32
0.876

Notes: All regressions include state fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0 .05, * p < 0 .1.
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Table 6: OLS Regression Results with Log Variables

Variables
vert
base
sas_ofc
sas_idp
stdev
per6in
acres
snowmke
lifts
hslift
gndla
trails
cong
Constant

Log Dependent Variable
Day Ticket Price
Season Pass Price
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
(0.000) (0.000)
-0.000* -0.000*
-0.000
-0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
(0.000) (0.000)
0.000
-0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.001
-0.004
(0.002)
(0.003)
-0.002
0.007
(0.003)
(0.004)
5.197
6.957
(4.627)
(6.721)
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
(0.000) (0.000)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
(0.000) (0.000)
0.008
0.005
-0.002
-0.007
(0.006) (0.006)
(0.009) (0.009)
0.396** 0.384**
0.462** 0.573**
(0.153) (0.182)
(0.225) (0.265)
0.116* 0.150**
-0.029
0.069
(0.062) (0.062)
(0.091) (0.091)
0.001
0.001
-0.000
-0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
(0.001) (0.001)
0.148*** 0.155** 0.216*** 0.217**
(0.052) (0.058)
(0.076) (0.085)
4.329*** 4.538*** 6.130*** 6.239***
(0.237) (0.355)
(0.349) (0.515)

Observations
120
79
120
79
R-squared
0.827
0.859
0.645
0.676
Notes: All regressions include state fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0 .05, * p < 0 .1.
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Table 7: OLS Regression Results without State FE

Variables
vert
base
sas_ofc
sas_idp
stdev
per6in
acres
snowmke
lifts
hslift
gndla
trails
congl
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Dependent Variable
Day Ticket Price
Season Pass Price
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
0.015*** 0.017***
0.330*** 0.330***
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.055)
(0.070)
0.004*** 0.005***
0.005
0.009
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.011)
(0.017)
0.000
-0.149
(0.017)
(0.273)
-0.276
-3.131
(0.169)
(2.856)
-0.007
-2.153
(0.157)
(2.657)
732.523
8,972.661
(440.715)
(7,445.923)
-0.005**
-0.005
-0.130*** -0.107**
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.039)
(0.048)
0.008
0.009
0.021
0.079
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.103)
(0.124)
1.420***
0.818
-4.912
-12.791
(0.483)
(0.599)
(7.866)
(10.117)
37.027*** 35.224** 553.521** 567.496**
(13.106) (16.074)
(213.332) (271.576)
15.280*** 18.943***
-32.449
1.426
(5.722)
(6.547)
(93.134) (110.605)
0.038
0.102
0.971
1.359
(0.073)
(0.094)
(1.181)
(1.585)
15.370*** 14.661**
112.363
92.470
(4.768)
(5.771)
(77.608)
(97.496)
4.368
-13.041
227.434*
196.504
(7.949)
(13.492)
(129.385) (227.943)
120
0.762

79
0.772

120
0.475

79
0.451

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0 .05, * p < 0 .1.
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Table 8: OLS Regression Results by Collapsed State

Variables
vert
base
sas_ofc
sas_idp
stdev
per6in
acres
snowmke
lifts
hslift
gndla
trails
cong
num_areas
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Dependent Variable
Day Ticket Price
Season Pass Price
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
0.009
0.021
0.170
0.473
(0.011)
(0.018)
(0.138)
(0.295)
0.005** 0.007**
-0.024
0.039
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.021)
(0.042)
-0.010
1.362**
(0.039)
(0.490)
0.477
8.362
(0.646)
(10.577)
-0.291
-10.746
(0.411)
(6.722)
-893.179
-10,138.906
(1,405.087)
(22,995.686)
-0.004
-0.013
-0.383***
-0.353*
(0.010)
(0.009)
(0.123)
(0.154)
0.020
0.093
0.166
1.491
(0.040)
(0.079)
(0.504)
(1.295)
-0.109
-0.392
-11.694
-7.700
(1.469)
(1.260)
(18.524)
(20.625)
21.149
2.940
923.468*
380.172
(37.604) (40.945)
(474.073) (670.106)
28.901
5.739
-570.130* -392.334
(21.762) (29.927)
(274.349) (489.780)
0.144
-0.074
9.973**
0.559
(0.329)
(0.527)
(4.142)
(8.622)
18.956
9.607
-513.154
-299.451
(22.834) (26.956)
(287.872) (441.163)
0.517
-0.107
3.115
-22.072
(0.874)
(1.396)
(11.022)
(22.850)
11.876
1.570
270.162
-104.751
(20.874) (34.238)
(263.166) (560.333)
23
0.783

19
0.898

23
0.835

19
0.881

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0 .05, * p < 0 .1.
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